

REMARKSSTATUS OF THE CLAIMS

[0001] Claims 1-22 remain in the case and stand rejected. Claims 1 and 3-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 as non-statutory subject matter. Claims 1-22 are rejected under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting in view of claim 1-20 of US Patent No. 6,813,616. Claims 1-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 4,815,005 (hereinafter "Oyanagi"). Claims 1 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by U.S. Patent No. 6,098,033 (hereinafter "Richardson"). Claims 2-12, and 14-22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being obvious in view of Oyanagi and Richardson. Applicants have amended Claims 1, 12, and 13. No new claims have been added.

RESPONSE TO CLAIM REJECTIONS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101

[0002] Claims 1 and 3-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §101 as non-statutory subject matter. Applicants have amended Claim 1 to recite a "computer implemented method" as suggested by the Examiner. Applicants submit that this amendment places Claims 1 and 3-11 with the statutory categories of invention.

RESPONSE TO REJECTION FOR OBVIOUSNESS-TYPE DOUBLE PATENTING

[0003] Applicants have included herewith a terminal disclaimer in response to the obvious-type double patenting rejection of Claims 1-22.

REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1-22 UNDER 35 U.S.C. §102(b)

[0004] The Examiner rejected claims 1-22 under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) in view of Oyanagi. Applicant respectfully traverses this rejection.

[0005] Applicants note that in the recent Office Action mailed 7/14/2005, substantially the same arguments rejecting Claims 1-22 under §102(b) in view of Oyanagi have been used again. The only difference being that an example of a question/query "(Does CLYDE own NEST 1?)" is recited and a larger section of Oyanagi Col. 5 lines 4-41 is referenced. Compare Office Action mailed 7/14/2005 with Office Action mailed 02/04/2004.

[0006] Applicants maintain the arguments set forth in the response and amendments filed May 3, 2004 and incorporates those arguments here by reference. Specifically, Applicants submit that Oyanagi fails to teach or disclose each element of the claimed invention as required under 35 U.S.C. §102(b). In particular, Applicants submit that Oyanagi fails to teach or disclose searching the semantic network with *each word* only once.

[0007] Applicants are confused that the §102(b) rejection of Claims 1-22 based on Oyanagi has been maintained in the recent Office Action in view of the notice of allowance issued May 28<sup>th</sup> 2004, shortly after the response was filed on May 3, 2004. Furthermore the notice of allowance stated the reasons for allowance as "In independent claims 1, 12-13, the limitation of consulting a semantic network to identify word patterns in a incoming stream of text, where each word in the incoming stream is searched once in the semantic network, taken with the other limitations of the claim, were not disclosed by, would not have been obvious over, nor otherwise fairly disclosed by the prior art of record." See Notice of Allowance mailed May 28<sup>th</sup> 2004, page 2. Applicants are confused that the recent Office Action states that Applicant's arguments with respect to Claims 1-22 are moot in view of new grounds of rejection when the 102(b) rejection has been asserted without a new prior art reference.

[0008] Applicants submit that the recent Office Action fails to provide new rationale why Claims 1-22 are anticipated by Oyanagi. In addition, Claims 1-22 have been found to not be anticipated by Oyanagi in the Notice of Allowance. Therefore, Applicants submit that Claims 1-22 are still allowable because Oyanagi still does not teach searching the semantic network with *each word* only once as explained in the response filed May 3, 2004. Applicants request that the rejection of Claim 1-22 under 35 U.S.C. §102(b) in view of Oyanagi be withdrawn.

REJECTION OF CLAIMS 1 and 13 UNDER 35 U.S.C. §102(e)

[0009] The recent Office Action rejected Claims 1 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) in view of Richardson. Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection.

[0010] The Federal Circuit has made clear that “[a]nticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102 requires the disclosure in a single piece of prior art of each and every limitation of a claimed invention.” *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Systems, Inc.*, 234 F.3d 14, 20, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d 1057, 1061 (Fed.Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the “identical invention must be shown in as complete detail [in the prior art] as is contained in the . . . claim” of the present invention. *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1913, 1920 (Fed.Cir.1989). Applicant respectfully asserts that Richardson fails to teach or disclose each element of the claimed invention as required under 35 U.S.C. §102(c).

[0011] Claim 1 recites in pertinent part:

“...consulting a semantic network to automatically identify one or more word patterns in the incoming stream of text, such that each word in the incoming stream is searched once in the semantic network...” (See Claim 1).

Applicants submit that Richardson fails to teach this element of Claim 1. The recent Office Action asserts that this quoted element is taught in Richardson at Col. 3, line 62- Col. 4 line 1 and Col. 4 lines 15-20. Applicants respectfully disagree and assert that subject matter in this quoted element is not even taught or suggested in Richardson.

[0012] Richardson in general teaches quantitative determination of paradigmatic, or “substitutional,” similarity between a pair of words. See Richardson, Col. 1, lines 40-42. Richardson makes these determinations using a training phase and a similarity determination phase. See Richardson, Col. 1 lines 50-60. So, the purpose of Richardson is to find a substitutional similarity between two words.

[0013] The Office Action suggests that in teaching identifying of salient semantic relation paths between two words Richardson anticipates the consulting element recited above. See Office Action mailed July 14<sup>th</sup> 2005, page 7. Richardson further explains that the salient semantic relation paths are derived from an automatically compiled lexical knowledge base. See

Richardson Col. 3, lines 65-67. The Office Action seems to suggest that "salient semantic relation paths" read on "word patterns" in Claim 1. Richardson goes on to teach that the salient semantic relation paths are **derived from** the lexical knowledge base. *Id.* This teaches that the salient semantic relation paths are found in the lexical knowledge base.

[0014] In contrast, Claim 1 recites that the "word patterns" are identified **"in the incoming stream of text."** Applicants submit that the "incoming stream of text" is fundamentally different from a "lexical knowledge base." Richardson does not teach an incoming stream of text. Instead, Richardson is concerned just with a word pair. Therefore, while "word patterns" may be interpreted as "salient semantic relation paths," Richardson and the present invention search for these paths or patterns in fundamentally different places. Therefore, Applicants submit that Richardson fails to teach or disclose "each and every limitation" as required for anticipation under 35 U.S.C. §102(e).

[0015] In addition, the Office Action appear to have neglected to consider the most recent form of Claim 1. The Office Action quoted Claim 1 with the old language about "a single examination of each word." Claim 1 has been amended in previous responses to recite **"such that each word in the incoming stream is searched once in the semantic network."** This means that each word of the incoming stream is only handled once in the searching of the semantic network. Richardson includes no teaching or disclosure relating to the number of times the words in the word pair are compared or searched in the lexical knowledge base.

[0016] Therefore, Applicants submit that because Richardson fails to teach or suggest "identify one or more word patterns **in the incoming stream of text**" such that each word **"in the incoming stream is searched once in the semantic network"** Richardson fails to anticipate Claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e). Applicants submit that Claim 13 includes substantially the same subject matter as Claim 1 discussed above. Applicants respectfully request that the rejection of Claims 1 and 13 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) be withdrawn.

REJECTION OF CLAIMS 2-12 and 14-22 UNDER 35 U.S.C. §103(a)

[0017] The recent Office Action rejected Claims 2-12 and 14-22 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) in view of Oyanagi and Richardson. Applicants respectfully traverse this rejection.

[0018] To establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness, the combination of the prior art references must teach or suggest all the claim limitations. MPEP § 2142. Applicants submit that because Oyanagi and Richardson fail to teach or disclose each element of the Independent Claims 1, 12, and 13, as explained above, Oyanagi and Richardson also fail to establish a *prima facie* case of obviousness. Claims 2-11 and 14-22 depend from the independent Claims 1 and 13 and therefore include all the limitations of these independent claims. Therefore, Applicants submit that Claims 2-12, and 14-22 are allowable for at least the same reasons as Independent Claims 1, 12, and 13.

[0019] Applicants assert that because the Office Action has not provided evidence of a teaching or suggestion of “identif[ing] one or more word patterns in the incoming stream of text” such that each word “in the incoming stream is searched once in the semantic network”, the Office Action has also failed to provide evidence of why one of skill in the art would select the prior art references or combine them. Therefore, this further supports Applicants’ assertion that Claims 2-12, and 14-22 are allowable 35 U.S.C. §103(a) over the prior art of record.


AMENDMENTS

[0001] Claims 1, 12, and 13 have been amended to clarify the invention. Specifically, Claims 1, 12, and 13 are amended to clarify that the known objects referenced are known objects “within the semantic network,” and that the known object is “identified by a word pattern of the semantic network.” This amendment is supported in the specification on page 8, lines 11-15 and page 9, lines 4-5. Applicants submit that these amendments further clarify the differences

between the prior art of record and the independent claims. Specifically, Oyanagi and Richardson fail to teach or disclose referencing a known object within the semantic network. At most, Richardson discloses relations relative to known **physical** objects such as a "beverage," a "drink," a "boat" or the like. See Richardson Col. 2, lines 40-47, 59-66. Richardson includes no teachings that these objects are within a semantic network.

[0002] In view of the foregoing, Applicant submits that the application is in condition for immediate allowance. In the event any questions remain, the Examiner is respectfully requested to initiate a telephone conference with the undersigned.

Respectfully submitted,



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